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Home > Archives for The Gold Standard Institute International > Page 35

Sources and Remedies of Financial Instability

May 14, 2011 by The Gold Standard Institute International

Gold Bond: Life-Saver for the U.S. and World Economy

Antal E. Fekete

http://www.professorfekete.com/articles%5CAEFSourcesRemediesOfFinancialInstability2.pdf

The watershed year was 1971. What made that year outstanding was not just the first-ever introduction of the world-wide floating exchange rate system, but also the disappearance of the most potent and reliable financial instrument that has ever existed. It was little noticed at the time. If ever mentioned, it was being treated as a non-event. Yet the world can only dismiss its significance at its own peril. Academia that is supposed to study problems created by monetary experimentation, rather than alerting the public to the most serious consequences of the omission, has been guilty of ignoring it.

The most potent financial instrument, the disappearance of which we are referring to, is the gold bond .

This observation would immediately be objected to by the detractors of gold in the monetary system. They would say that the gold bond had disappeared from world finance much earlier: in the years 1931-35. Its disappearance gave no occasion for any major catastrophe in its wake. Rather, the word economy has gone on from one triumph to another without gold bonds ever since ⎯ proving the inconsequential nature of their being phased out. However, this objection is not valid.

The truth of the matter is that the gold bond had survived the collapse of the gold standard in the early 1930’s and has played a most important albeit largely unrecognized role in world finance afterwards. Consider the fact that since January, 1934, the dollar has had a fixed value in terms of gold, based on the Treasury price of $35 per ounce of fine gold, and the U.S. government has continued to honor its international dollar obligations in gold at that rate. Moreover, this obligation was solemnly enshrined in several international treaties and confirmed by four sitting presidents. As a result, there is no gainsaying of the fact that U.S. Treasury paper in the hands of foreign governments and central banks directly, and in the hands of banks, financial institutions, and even ordinary citizens not under the jurisdiction of the U.S. indirectly, have continued to exist as gold bonds (or gold bills, as the case may be) after 1934.

The most important role the gold bond has played up until 1971 was this: it was the standard of credit whereby all other debt instruments were gaged. Through disintermediation substandard debt was eliminated, and the rise of the Debt Behemoth prevented.

Ignoring this fact is a major error that Academia has been and still is making. To continue to deny this fact leads to further grievous errors. There used to be a saying on Lombard Street, long since forgotten, that “there is only one thing that is safer and arguably more desirable to hold than gold, namely, the promise of a government to pay gold ”. In that spirit gold bonds were considered an “ultimate form of debt”, enforcing quality standards. Moreover, the U.S. Treasury bill in the hands of foreigners was, along with gold, the ultimate extinguisher of debt . This instrument was destroyed on August 15, 1971. On that day gold was exiled from the international monetary system. Since that day the world has lacked an ultimate extinguisher of debt.

Any other means of payment, including Federal Reserve credit, however useful in international trade or otherwise, could not extinguish debt. It could only shift debt from one debtor to another (ultimately, to the U.S. government). As long as there were gold bonds in existence, a Debt Behemoth could not rise to threaten world finance with destruction. Whenever total debt in the world approached the danger level, safety-conscious governments and banks quietly started converting their holdings of debt into gold bonds, thus squeezing marginal debt out of existence. This also explains the absence of a derivative tower and other unsafe financial constructions, instruments and practices, such as mortgage-based bonds, or bank-loan-backed bonds, prior to 1971.

World trade was financed and regulated by gold to the extent that the great trading houses abroad kept a portfolio of gold bonds in their balance sheet. In effect they were doing arbitrage between the gold bond market and the market for internationally traded merchandise. If the gold rate of interest (the yield of U.S. Treasury bonds) rose, they sold out marginal merchandise from warehouses without reordering them, and invested the proceeds in gold bonds. If subsequently the gold rate of interest rates fell back, then they would sell the gold bond at a profit, and invest the proceeds in marginal merchandise, the trading of which out of the warehouse yielded better profit than that available from holding the gold bond. This arbitrage was real, continuous, and it kept international trade on an even keel. Academia has missed this important arbitrage responsible for regulating world trade after World War II. It has also been guilty of failing to point out that, without gold bonds, world trade is clueless, subject to deterioration and open to manipulation.

In 1971, by a stroke of the pen, gold bonds were stamped out of existence. World trade lost its guiding star. The floodgates of exorbitant debt creation were opened. The fast debt-breeder was turned on. Debt of dubious quality flooded the word, the soundness of which could no longer be gaged in the absence of gold bonds. There was no sink to absorb excess and waste. This explains the origin of the debt tower, and the steady deterioration of the quality of its component parts. This process is still continuing. Worst of all, the series of financial crises in the world also continues. Every one of them will be more devastating than the preceding one — unless something is done about it, and soon . In the absence of remedial measures now the momentum of the approaching avalanche will become overwhelming.

Having made the correct diagnosis, the remedy readily presents itself. The gold bond should be brought back . There is presently a great latent demand for gold bonds in the world, as indicated by the high marketability U.S. Treasury bonds are still enjoying — something that cannot be justified on purely economic grounds in view of the net debt of the U.S. government and the tenaciousness of the American trade and budget deficits. Make no mistake about it: the high marketability of the U.S. Treasury bonds is justified solely by the fact that there is still a residual hope that the U.S. government will, in its own self-interest as well as in the interest of the world economy, make them payable in gold at maturity, and will pay interest on them in gold in the meantime.

Most significantly, there is a convincing precedent in U.S. history for this. During the Civil War and its aftermath, the U.S. government continued to honor its debt, both as to principal and interest, paying them in the gold coin of the realm. To be able to do it, the government continued to levy import duties and excise taxes in gold - to the exclusion of paper. The exchange rate between the gold dollar and the paper dollar (endearingly called the ‘greenback’ by their protagonists) was fluctuating. The government need not embrace a gold standard in order to enjoy the benefits offered by the gold bond.

There is no reason why the U.S. could not emulate the Civil War practice in the present crisis. Admittedly, it would take extensive research to work out the details. For example, the question arises how gold bonds can survive in a fiat paper money system (or how a fiat paper money system can prosper in an environment where gold bonds exist and enjoy the highest prestige). At any rate, the intellectual resources to conduct such research are all at hand. If not residing in Academia, then, at least, they are scattered around in small discussion groups and can be accessed through the Internet. There ought to be such a thing as “shadow research” offering sorely missed competition to mainstream economics on the gold question.

The first obstacle that confronts the present effort by the U.S. government and the Fed to put the great financial crisis behind them is that it runs head on into Triffin’s Dilemma. Already in the early 1960’s Robert Triffin observed that the stated aims of increasing ‘world liquidity’ and those of eliminating the U.S. budget deficit are contradictory. They cannot be simultaneously accomplished.

Likewise, the present effort to rein in the U.S. government deficit and reduce the outstanding government debt, while simultaneously increasing the stock of money through direct sales of government bonds by the Treasury to the Fed (euphemistically called QE 1 & 2) are contradictory. It is like trying to have one’s cake and eat it. On the one hand the Fed wants to inject more Federal Reserve credit into the payments system - while the “other hand”, the government, pretends to choke off the supply of the necessary collateral through eliminating the budget deficit. Politicians, mainstream economists and financial journalists sing the praise of this scheme without realizing that it cannot be done. The two aims are contradictory, and the market will not be fooled by the prestidigitation.

Most mainstream economists have a vested interest in maintaining their anti-gold stance. Their prestige is committed to Keynes’ dictum that the gold standard (and, by implication, gold) is nothing but a ‘barbarous relic’. However, if they really believe in a goldless monetary system, then they should have nothing to fear in exposing their fiat paper scheme to competition with the gold bond. Hand-to-hand money will still be irredeemable under the suggested remedial action. The fact that this will cause the managers of fiat money to make their instrument deliver stellar performance so that people shall have no desire to dump paper in favor of gold is an added benefit. The remedial action proposed here ought not to be seen as an attempt to return to the gold standard through the back door. The proposal is to allow the gold bond to discharge its natural function, to wit: weeding out bad debt - something irredeemable debt cannot do.

A great failing of monetary scholarship is the one-sided appraisal of the origin and subsequent evolution of the Federal Reserve System that came about as a result of six years of thorough study and public debate in the wake of the 1907 financial panic. It was not even remotely considered during the debate that the Fed coming off the drawing board ought to be an engine monetizing government debt. Just the opposite is true: the Fed was supposed to be a commercial paper system whereby self-liquidating bills of exchange would acquire ephemeral monetary privileges, facilitating the movement of semi-finished merchandise from the producer to the ultimate consumer. This was not considered inflationary: pari passu with the sale of merchandise to the ultimate consumer the expiring bills diminish the money supply dollar for dollar.

Nor was it thought possible during the debate that the monetary unit of the United States could be anything but the Constitutional double eagle gold coin. There was nothing sinister about the study and the debate. There was no conspiracy. It was all in the open. All questions could be openly asked and would be honestly answered.

The outcome, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was far from being a perfect document. It had many weak points, errors of commission as well as errors of omission. It had a lot of room for improvement. But it was acceptable for the purpose of putting credit, such as existed within the confines of the United States, on a sound and enduring financial basis.

Mischief occurred after the Federal Reserve banks opened their door for business in 1914, about the same time when the war in Europe got started. Without much thinking, and in an obvious violation of the law and the neutrality of the country, the Administration of president Wilson committed the new Federal Reserve banks to the task of financing of the allied war effort in Europe. The idea of self-liquidating credit was discarded; credit was created expressly to finance destruction. You could not get further away from the ideal of self-liquidating credit than putting credit in the service of destroying life and property.

This takes us to the second remedy: restoration of self-liquidating credit . The idea that the central bank can calibrate the rate of debasement of the currency by adjusting the speed of the printing press is absurd. It is only surpassed by the absurdity of the notion that the Federal Open Market Committee can divine, pick, and set the optimal interest rate that will make the GDP grow, payrolls swell, prices stabilize, and prosperity endure.

Historically, commercial banks came into existence not to ‘create’ credit but to ‘liquefy’ it. Commercial credit takes its origin in the handshake of two businessmen while one saying to the other: “I’ll pay you for this shipment in 90 days”. The handshake later took the form of a real bill. It had the advantage that it could be endorsed and passed on to a third party in payment for other merchandise.

Thus the formula to solve the present crisis of instability, and to fend off the threatening credit collapse is: Go back to gold bonds and real bills. Adopt the best agents of credit there obtain, in place of intrinsically worthless promises. Substitute the real source of credit, the handshake of two businessmen, for the stroke of the banker’s pen.

The hour is late. At stake is the survival of the U.S. and the world economy as we know it. Failure to act now would lead to a disaster comparable only to the collapse of the Roman Empire in the fifth century A.D. that was accompanied with a total breakdown of law and order while, significantly enough, gold was going into hiding.

* The title of this essay is borrowed from a list of research topics proposed by the Institute for New Economic Thinking . The author submitted this essay for consideration, but the Institute declined to entertain it.

in Munich, Bavaria, Germany

Aug. 20 - 29, 2011

Also discussing:

Guest Lecturer: Sandeep Jaitly (United Kingdom)

The school is meant for all students (including beginners) interested in the thought of Carl Menger (1840-1921) and, more generally, in the Austrian theory of money, credit and banking in the spirit of Menger. The school’s program plans to cover the whole spectrum of Austrian economics. It is recommended especially for those who have read the papers of Prof. Fekete about the instability of the present monetary system and the danger of a world-wide credit collapse, available on the Internet, see the website .

The complete program consists of four courses (10 days, 20 lectures in all). Completion of each of the four courses will earn one credit. Students with 4 credits will earn a diploma, signed by Professor Fekete. The four courses are as follows:

Course I: Disorder and Coordination in Economics — Has the world reached the ultimate economic and monetary disorder?

Course II: Adam Smith’s Real Bills Doctrine and Social Circulating Capital

Course III: The Austrian Theory of Interest and Discount

Course IV: The Austrian Theory of Money, Credit and Banking

Courses I and II have been given in Hungary in 2010 and earlier this year. There are plans to repeat them in Munich next year.

For further information contact: or phone: +49-170-380-3948 (please take time-zone difference into account)

Filed Under: Antal E. Fekete, Gold and Silver, Popular Economics

Permanent Gold Backwardation: The Crack Up Boom

May 10, 2011 by The Gold Standard Institute International

http://keithweiner.posterous.com

Professor Antal Fekete has written several pieces discussing gold backwardation, and arguing that this is the red alert signal for the coming financial Armageddon, when the tower of unpayable debts collapses. In this paper, I delve deeper into this topic. My goal is to make this topic approachable by the layman and describe what I think will happen when backwardation in gold futures becomes permanent.

Most people define “backwardation” for a commodity as when the price of a future contract is lower than the price in the spot market. But since there are two prices for everything, we must look at the bid and the offer. They are more meaningful than the last cleared price (which is what people think of as “the price”). So we must refine the concept of backwardation slightly, as I will show below.

In backwardation, one can sell a physical good for cash and simultaneously buy a future to make a profit. Note that in doing this trade, one’s position does not change in the end. One begins with a certain amount of the good and ends (upon maturity of the contract) with that amount of the good.

So let us examine the actual trade that any arbitrager in the market could do. To sell the physical commodity, one must take the bid. And likewise, to buy the future one must pay the offer. With this arbitrage in mind, we define the term:

Backwardation is when the bid in the spot market > offer on a future

Why is this important? What does it mean?

Many commodities, like wheat, are produced seasonally. But consumption is much more evenly spread around the year. Immediately prior to the harvest, the spot price of wheat is normally at its highest. This is because wheat stocks in the warehouses are very low. People will have to pay a higher price for immediate delivery. At the same time, everyone in the market knows that the harvest will be in one month. So the price, if a buyer can wait one month for delivery, is lower. This is a case of backwardation.

Normally, backwardation is a signal that a commodity is scarce. This is because if anyone had a quantity of it, they could make a risk-free profit by delivering it and getting it back later. Markets do not normally offer risk-free profits, and in the case of backwardation there is not normally a real opportunity to make a risk-free profit because the good really is scarce—no one actually has a lot of it to sell at that time.

It is worth delving into arbitrage briefly to complete the point about backwardation. Arbitrage is, in essence, an attempt to make a profit on a spread (usually by buying one thing and selling another). The important thing to note is that the arbitrager pays the offer on what he buys, thus lifting said offer, and takes the bid on what he sells, thus depressing said bid. The arbitrager, alone or with many others doing the same trade, will usually force the spread to narrow to the point where further arbitrage is no longer profitable. If it is possible to make a risk-free profit someone will do it, and another, and so on until it is no longer to make a risk-free profit.

I said “usually” because in the case of a shortage of wheat it is not possible to make a risk-free profit unless one has physical wheat in one’s warehouse. In the case when there is not enough grain remaining in stock to compress this spread, backwardation persists (or grows) until the harvest.

Earlier, I said backwardation “normally” means there is a shortage. But what if backwardation happens to gold? There is more gold in human possession than any other commodity by a factor of 100 or more (abundance or scarcity must be measured as a ratio of stocks or inventories to flows or annual production—the absolute amount is not important). Given gold’s massive accumulated inventories, a “shortage” of gold is impossible.

So what does gold backwardation really mean?

For ordinary commodities, the lower price on the future contract vs. spot signals the relative scarcity available for delivery today vs. delivery in the future. But what would a lower price on gold for future delivery mean compared to a higher price on gold to be had in one’s hand today? Well, mechanically, it means that gold delivered to the market is in short supply.

The meaning of gold backwardation is that trust in future delivery scarce, vs. trust in the gold in one’s hands today.

In an ordinary commodity, scarcity of the physical good available for delivery today is resolved by higher prices. At a high enough price, demand for wheat falls until existing stocks are sufficient to meet the reduced demand.

But how is scarcity of trust resolved?

Thus far, the answer has been via higher prices. However, when backwardation becomes permanent, then trust in the gold futures market will have collapsed. Unlike with wheat, millions of people and some large institutions have plenty of gold they can sell in the physical market and buy back via futures contracts. When they choose not to, that is the beginning of the end of the current financial system.

Why?

Think about the similarities between the following three statements:

  • “My paper gold future contract will be honored by delivery of gold.”
  • “If I trade my gold for paper now, I will be able to get gold back in the future.”
  • “I will be able to exchange paper money for gold in the future.”

I submit that it will not take gold holders a long time to arrive at the inevitable conclusion. If some holders of gold do not agree, then they will sell (at higher prices, probably) to those who do. Soon enough, there will not be sellers of gold in the physical market.

With an ordinary commodity, there is a limit to what buyers are willing to pay based on the need satisfied by that commodity, the availability of substitutes, and the buyers’ other needs that also must be satisfied within the same budget. The higher the price, the more that holders are motivated to sell and the less that consumers are motivated (or able) to buy. The cure for high prices is high prices.

But gold is different. Unlike wheat, it is not bought for consumption. While some people hold it to speculate on increases in its paper price, by the logic above, they will be replaced by people who are holding it because they do not trust paper and want to hold gold because gold is money.

Gold does not have a “high enough” price that will discourage buying or encourage selling. No amount of price change will bring back trust in paper currencies once said currencies decline past the threshold where it is obvious to a critical mass of people. Thus gold backwardation will not only recur, but at some (hard to predict) point, it will not leave its backwardated state.

In looking at the bid and offer, one other fact is germane to this discussion. In times of crisis, it is always the big that is withdrawn; there is never a lack of offers. Another way of looking at permanent gold backwardation is as the withdrawal of gold’s (i.e. money’s) bid on irredeemable government debt paper (e.g. dollar bills). But paper’s bid on gold is unlimited.

The remainder of this essay address what will happen to non-monetary goods when gold goes into permanent backwardation. Note that it is possible that silver will go into backwardardation prior to, concurrently with, or following gold. I make no prediction about the sequence. In the following discussion, everything should be interpreted to apply to silver as well as gold.

Many people who hold paper but who desire to hold gold will buy (e.g.) crude oil for paper, and then sell it for gold (I will call buying a commodity for paper to sell it for gold “gold arbitrage”). This will drive up the price of crude in terms of paper, and drive down the price of crude in terms of gold. Even if this “window” were to remain open indefinitely, it is obvious that larger and larger amounts of paper will buy dwindling amounts of gold. This is because of the twin rising prices of crude-in-paper and gold-in-crude.

For example, if today the price of a barrel of crude in terms of paper is $100 and gold priced in crude is 15 barrels, then $1500 can be traded for one ounce of gold this way. But if the price of crude in paper rises to $2000 and the price of gold in crude rises to 150 barrels, then one would need $300,000 to trade for one ounce of gold this way. There will always be a gold bid on crude, but it need not necessarily be high.

Of course, this window will shut sooner or later (I suspect sooner), as I show below.

To summarize, what I have outlined above is the logical outcome of permanent gold backwardation. With an understanding of Austrian economics, particularly the ideas of Carl Menger and Antal Fekete, one can see that in permanent gold backwardation the following steps are inevitable:

  • Withdrawal of offers to sell physical gold for paper money
  • Skyrocketing price of liquid commodities in terms of paper
  • Falling price of commodities in terms of gold

Gold is not officially recognized as the foundation of the financial system. Yet it is still a necessary component, without which the system will collapse. As I will show, it is impossible to divorce gold and paper without also divorcing commodities and paper.

Earlier, I gave three equivalent statements:

  • “My paper gold future contract will be honored by delivery of gold.”
  • “If I trade my gold for paper now, I will be able to get gold back in the future.”
  • “I will be able to exchange paper money for gold in the future.”

My point was to show that these statements are all false. They are false for the same reason. This is what is discovered by the market, when it goes into permanent backwardation. Paper currencies are backed by debt, and the debt has grown far past the point where it could possibly be repaid. It is rapidly approaching the point where the interest cannot be kept current. So governments and other borrowers seek to borrow ever more money to pay the interest on their debt and to cover their permanent deficits. This cannot continue forever, or indeed much longer.

There is a fourth statement that is equivalent to the other three above:

“My paper money will be accepted in trade for the goods I need in the future”

If the first three are false, this one is also necessarily false.

The commodity producers will eventually be forced to do business by buying their inputs for gold and selling their outputs for gold. To validate this, let us use the technique of assuming the opposite is true, and see if that leads to a contradiction. Let us assume that commodity producers will continue to operate by buying their inputs for paper and selling their outputs for paper. As discussed above, paper prices for their output products will be skyrocketing. At first, this would seem to be good for them.

However, we must consider that each business needs to keep the appropriate balance of its capital in cash, ready to pay for inputs, wages, etc. Under conditions of rapidly rising prices for inputs, cash is rapidly losing purchasing power. One cannot keep cash for more than a day (if that), without losing precious capital. Every business will spend its cash as quickly as possible. Now someone has to hold it, as the cash does not go out of existence when one spends it—it just goes into someone else’s hands. So this will be a period of rapidly accelerating capital decumulation. Second, most businesses will have a suboptimal allocation of cash which is determined, not by rational analysis, but by this game of “hot potato”. This leads to another consequence: shortages.

Ordinarily, the businessman does not want to keep excess inventory of his output product. This is because the marginal utility of oil or tires or whatever declines rapidly, but the marginal utility of money (even paper money) does not. But in the condition of gold backwardation, the marginal utility of paper is declining faster than any real product.

So the commodity producer would be wise to keep its output in inventory, and only sell his products as he needs the cash to buy another input. This is inefficient, and tantamount to losing the benefit of indirect trade. It will cause supply disruptions to businesses that use this commodity as their input. It will also cause much wider spreads, as the market becomes less liquid, and rapidly changing prices add the risk that a normally profitable spread could become unprofitable. Narrow spreads are a sign of increasing economic coordination; widening spreads are a sign of collapsing coordination.

In gold backwardation, the next problem for commodity producers to (somehow) address is: how can a business use a rapidly diminishing currency as its unit of account? How is one to even determine whether production is profitable or unprofitable? Hint: if a business is decumulating capital, it is making losses.

One must also consider real demand (as opposed to the demand for a medium for the gold arbitragers). As the paper price rises, most buyers don’t have unlimited amounts of paper to pay. How many people can fill their car with gasoline every week at $100 per gallon? How about $1000? Real demand for commodities is collapsing in this environment (going back to the analysis above, recall that the prices of commodities in gold are falling). But the prices are rising in paper terms. Regardless of the value of paper money, in real terms: most businesses that produce a good with rapidly falling demand do not make a profit.

Another challenge comes from the fact that not all prices rise equally. As discussed above, the primary driver for liquid commodity prices is the arbitrage to get into gold, because there will always be a gold bid for food and energy. But what about specialty manufactured products?

Machine parts and truck tires do not make a suitable vehicle for the gold arbitrage, and so their prices may not rise to the extent of oil and wheat. The spread (i.e. profit margin) for manufacturers of these items, who need to buy oil as their inputs, may very well become permanently negative. While there will be some demand from commodity producers to provide a bid, such thinly traded markets could see enormous volatility. The nature of a business who makes a specialty product for a thinly traded market, especially a business which is thinly capitalized, is that it must make a profit every month or at least every quarter or else close its doors. Even if the spread reverts to the mean, an inversion lasting one or two months could be enough to destroy such a company.

And even if the spread does not collapse, think of the behavior of their customers. Unlike oil drillers whose output product is in constant demand (especially by the gold arbitragers), who can choose exactly when they sell their products, specialty manufacturers are not sovereign. They must sell when buyers want to buy. But their buyers, the commodity producers, are going to be controlling their buying and selling in larger batches rather than the steady buying of “just in time” that was operative when the currency was stable.

So a summary of (some) consequences suffered by all commodity producers who try to do business in terms of paper money after permanent gold backwardation:

  • Capital decumulation due to the necessity of holding some cash at some times while said cash is rapidly falling in value
  • Supply shortages, including failure of critical vendors, causing production disruptions and lost time/money
  • Hoarding of produced goods
  • Collapsing real demand
  • Skyrocketing prices do not perfectly compensate for skyrocketing costs
  • Rising volatility and widening spreads across the board
  • No usable unit of account for one’s books, so losses will (temporarily) look like gains
  • As currency devolves, efficiency of transactions devolves also to become more like direct (barter) trade, requiring coincidence of wants or at least timing

Without even addressing strikes by workers, failure of critical infrastructure like the electrical grid, or the breakdown of law and order (how will the government collect and use taxes to employ police and firefighters?), it should be clear that businesses who use paper money will not be able to operate profitably for long.

Thus it is safe to conclude that the gold miners will not continue to provide gold to the paper market. The same holds true for all other commodities. By temporarily assuming that commodity producers could continue to supply goods to sell for paper, the opposite has been proven.

While no one can predict the timing, and I think that it will be years away, my conclusion is that Von Mises’ “Crack Up Boom” is an inevitable consequence of permanent gold backwardation.

© Keith Weiner May 10, 2011

Filed Under: Gold and Silver, Keith Weiner, Popular Economics

Back to the Gold Standard

May 9, 2011 by The Gold Standard Institute International

http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/05/back_to_the_gold_standard.html

“Most Americans believe the massive federal budget deficit is a very serious problem that will create hardships for future generations,” found a CBS News/New York Times poll earlier this year.

This finding is consistent with a number of other surveys which have been conducted in recent months. Poll after poll shows that the majority of Americans are deeply concerned about out-of-control spending, runaway budget deficits, and the ballooning national debt.

The concern is amply justified given that our federal government is essentially bankrupt. With a national debt of $14.3 trillion and with $100 trillion plus in long-term entitlement liabilities, it has assumed more obligations that it can ever conceivably make good upon.

Remarkably, neither of the two major political parties is willing to take meaningful measures to address this existential crisis. Even though they both talk about the need to cut deficits and bring spending under control, the practical result of their proposals and actions is the same — more spending, more debt, and more deficits.

But there is a way to bring about restraint. It is called the gold standard, and it is the only foolproof method of placing the government under fiscal discipline.

Under the gold standard all financial instruments — including dollar notes and government securities — must ultimately be backed by existing physical metal. At today’s prices, America’s national debt would roughly translate into double all the gold ever mined. This should give a good idea of the excessiveness involved here. In any case, the gold standard would have made it impossible for the fiscal fix we are now in to come about.

It is quite possible that under the gold standard our government would run surpluses on a regular basis. When debts are incurred in a world of real money, the first question voters usually ask is: “Where is our government going to get the gold required to satisfy its obligations?”

Since gold cannot be manufactured at will in some government facility, there is obviously only one place where it can come from: From the population, through taxation.

When deficits balloon under the gold standard, people are acutely conscious of the fact that it is with their own gold — real and precious — that budget shortfalls will have to be paid for.

Thus under the gold standard, the reality of debt is driven home in a hard and immediate way. With an electorate so sensitized, debt-addicted politicians tend to quickly suffer the consequences of their profligate ways. It is, therefore, no surprise that governments whose currencies are pegged to gold almost always behave in fiscally responsible fashion.

Under a fiat money regime such as we have now, the situation is altogether different. Debt can be run up easily, because politicians are not tied to anything real that would put a check on how much of it can be issued. Even when the bonds themselves come due, government can simply create more money to pay off creditors.

When this money also happens to be the world’s reserve currency, the temptation to be irresponsible is especially acute. Hence we now have a situation now in the United States whereby the federal government borrows 42 cents of every dollar it spends.

The gold standard would change matters dramatically by immediately forcing fiscal discipline on Washington. This was pointed out last week by Steve Forbes who came out in favor of the gold standard in an interview with editors of Human events: “With a stable currency [i.e., gold-backed dollar], it is much harder for governments to borrow excessively,” he said.

It is, indeed. This quality of the gold standard is sometimes referred to as the golden shackles. And it is the main reason why politicians everywhere oppose it with such vigor.

But never mind the displeasure of the political elites. Under the gold standard most of us would be much better off. The gold standard would protect the purchasing power of our earnings and the long-term value of our savings by preventing politicians from degrading our money with debts without limit.


Vasko Kohlmayer
May 19, 2011

Filed Under: Gold and Silver, Popular Economics, Vasko Kohlmayer

The Gold Standard Journal – Issue #5

May 1, 2011 by The Gold Standard Institute International

Articles: Editorial, News, False Belief #4: Currencies Are Money, Money and Marketability, From London, What the heck, if anything, does ‘backing’ a currency mean?, When Will the Stock Market be Worth Your Gold?, Gold Confiscation, What Is the Real Bills Doctrine?, Follow Up on Reserve Bank of Australia‘s 1997 gold sale

See linked PDF document.

TheGoldStandardJournal5.pdf

Filed Under: Journal

Hearken to the Sacred Geese of Juno Moneta

April 11, 2011 by The Gold Standard Institute International

Antal E. Fekete

http://www.professorfekete.com/articles%5CAEFJunoMoneta.pdf

On April 6 last I sent an open letter Congressmen Ron Paul of Texas accusing the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Dr. Ben Bernanke, that

(1) his program of Quantitative Easing (QE) whereby the Federal Reserve banks purchase U.S. Treasury paper directly from

the U.S. Treasury is not authorized by the Federal Reserve Act and is therefore unlawful;

(2) even if for the sake of argument we disregard where the Fed buys its paper, the sum appears to be higher than all

available Federal Reserve credit outstanding and, moreover, the F.R. banks do not have unencumbered collateral to

post in order to create more to conclude these purchases.

I have received an unusually large feedback in my e-mail. People want to know how I can substantiate these accusations against Dr. Bernanke. Of course I cannot say that I have caught Dr. Bernanke red-handed. All I can do is to present circumstantial evidence.

I start with a statement that I am fully aware of the seriousness of my accusations, and my responsibility in making them. I do not make them frivolously. I have been contemplating to do it for decades. My reasons for postponing have to do with calculating for maximum impact. I am but an isolated individual trying to take on the incumbent of one of the most powerful offices ever created on this earth. Wrong timing may be suicidal.

I first came to suspect that in injecting F.R. credit in the domestic and world economy the Fed was in violation of the law when former Chairman Alan Greenspan inundated the money markets shortly after taking office following the stock market crash in 1989. My suspicion was that he got away with it by simply reversing the two-step creation of F.R. credit, namely, FIRST STEP: posting collateral; SECOND STEP: issuing F.R. notes and creating F.R. deposits.

Reversing the process would have meant that Greenspan had FIRST issued the notes and created deposits and, SECOND: with them he had purchased Treasury paper pledging them for the purpose of creating credit ex post facto (retroactively).

To the uninitiated this simple reversal may look innocuous enough and, indeed, Greenspan could have argued that nothing more than a simple house-keeping change was put into effect that fell well within his authority. On closer scrutiny, however, it appeared that it was not a housekeeping change at all. It was, if indeed it happened the way I have assumed it did, an instance of usurpation of power that Congress alone has: to amend the Federal Reserve Act. No abundance of words would change the fact that, if Greenspan had done that, then he had created F.R. credit in blatant violation of the law. The difference made by the reversal was the difference between issuing F.R. credit lawfully, or issuing it unlawfully.

To see this just imagine that you are applying for a loan at the bank. The manager lets you sign the note and credits your account with an equivalent deposit. In escorting you to the door he pats you on the back and, when you are on the street, gives you a parting shout: “Don’t forget to drop back with the collateral at your convenience!”

If my allegations came anywhere close to the truth, then it would mean that the pregnant Trojan horse has been dragged up the hill and is now firmly implanted inside of the inner sanctum of the citadel. The Greek soldiers hiding inside the wooden horse were just waiting for the signal to get out of its belly, to fall upon the inhabitants of Troy and murder them in their sleep, women, children and all.

Translate that ancient story of Homer to our present situation and see that pirates have taken over our government’s finances, and are getting ready to help themselves to the public purse. These pirates apparently believe that members of the Legislative Branch, congressmen and senators, are simpletons. They can be easily persuaded that no more than a mere technical housekeeping change is involved. After all it is inconsequential, is it not, whether the cleaning people wash the windows first and scrub the floor afterwards, or whether they do them in the opposite order. The same is true, for the stronger reason, for the experts at the Fed.

Should anyone try to tip off legislators about the prestidigitation, he could always be dismissed as a ‘foggy bottom belly-acher’. Only a heartless economic royalist would deny relief money to the unemployed, the breadwinner with a foreclosed home, and their starving families. Also, remember, Treasury paper was bought by the Fed directly from the Treasury to keep the rate of interest fixed during World War II. Now we are at war once more combating terrorism. Can we do any less than we did then, to achieve victory?

I have known Congressman Ron Paul for close to forty years. I respect him and I think I can confidently say that he also respects me. He knows I am a careful scholar. I thought of briefing him on my suspicion. On second thought, however, I rejected the idea. It would be unfair to him on account of the scanty evidence I could offer. It would only embarrass him. He would have to fight an army of Fed attorneys, Fed accountants, and Fed economists single handedly. They would easily discredit him. It would be a lonely fight, against the odds, on a slanting field, adjudicated by an umpire bribed with our own money.

A better plan would be to wait until the pirates make a mistake, as they were likely to do after their initial successes. Given enough rope, they might just hang themselves.

I think this is exactly what has happened with QE, the rope the pirates asked for and got. QE I was an enormous over-reach. Yet, incredibly, no one at home or abroad has even questioned its legality. Pirates in the belly of the Trojan horse thought that their hour has struck. They were ready for the massacre.

The combined F.R. credit creation of QE I and II exceeds one trillion dollars. There is no way underneath the Sun to come up with unencumbered collateral of that magnitude to make this miraculous money proliferation legal.

It is time to blow the whistle. It is time for the sacred geese of Juno Moneta to honk, sounding the wake-up call for the sleepers to start defending themselves against mortal danger: that of being sold into slavery.

French boys and girls, if you asked them where the French equivalent of the word ‘money’ has come from, would answer: “Why, it means ‘silver’, doesn’t it?” By contrast, most native English speakers don’t know the origin of the English word ‘money’. That’s a pity because the explanation is fascinating. It is wrapped in a fairy-tale like story. Well, schools do not teach fairy tales any more, even if they have a moral on which your life may one day depend.

Many years after the rape of Troy by the Greeks, Rome was similarly threatened by its enemy, the barbarian tribe of the Gauls that invaded the peninsula and put Rome under siege. Inhabitants took refuge in the Capitolium.

The patroness of Rome was the supreme goddess Juno, wife of Jupiter, the father of the Olympian gods and goddesses. The Romans built a magnificent temple for her honor inside Capitolium, the citadel at the top of the hill which doubled up as the Mint where the gold, silver and copper coins of Rome were struck. In the garden around the temple the sacred geese of Juno dwelt.

In the back of the temple the hill was steep and full of cliffs with no roads. The Romans expected the assault to come from the opposite side that was less steep and where the roads were. Accordingly, the Romans left the back of the hill undefended. The invaders decided to take advantage of that. They approached the hill from that side and wanted to surprise the inhabitants under the cover of the night and murder them in their sleep.

They climbed the cliffs. Their plan would have probably succeeded but for the sacred geese of Juno that started honking loud when they noticed the invaders. That in turn woke up the defenders who drove off the enemy and defeated them decisively in the battle that followed next day. Unlike the story of Troy, this one had a happy ending.

The Romans gave thanks to their patroness Juno and thereafter called her Juno Moneta (Juno the warner, or Juno the admonitor). And Rome went on to great things. Her coins carried her fame, glory and riches to the far corners of the known world. And because they were minted in the temple of Juno Moneta, people lovingly called them ‘money’.

Let this be the wake-up call for America. Terrorism is a red herring. The real enemy is already inside of the citadel. The pirates have taken over the Fed. The sacred geese of Juno are honking loudly.

May Juno Moneta once more save our civilization.

A. E. Fekete, Impeach Bernanke! www.professorfekete.com, April 6, 2011

April 12, 2011.

Filed Under: Antal E. Fekete, Gold and Silver, Popular Economics

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