There would be no central bank with its “experts” to dictate the rate of interest and no “lender of last resort”. There would be no Securities Act, no deposit insurance, no armies of banking regulators, and definitely no bailouts or “too big to fail”. The government would have little role in the monetary system, save to catch criminals and enforce contracts.
As mentioned in Part I, people would enjoy the right to own gold coins, or deposit them in a bank if they wish. We propose the radical idea that the government should have no more involvement in specifying the contents of the gold coin than it does specifying the contents of the software that runs a web server. And this is for the same reason: the market is far better at determining what people need and far better at adapting to changing needs.
In 1792, metallurgy was primitive. To accommodate 18th century gold refiners, the purity of the gold coin was set at around 90% pure gold (interestingly the Half Eagle had a slightly different purity than the Eagle though exactly half the pure gold content). Today, much higher purities can easily be produced, along with much smaller coins (see Gold – Pieces of 50). We also have plastic sleeves today, to eliminate wear and tear on pure gold coins, which are quite soft.
If the government had fixed a mandatory computer standard in the early 1980’s (some governments considered it at the time), we would still be using floppy disks, we would not have folders, and most of us would not be using any kind of computer at all, as they were not user friendly. When something is fixed in law, it is no longer possible to innovate. Instead, companies lobby the government for changes in the law to benefit them at the expense of everyone else. No good ever comes of this.
We propose the radical idea that one should not need permission to walk down the street, to open a bank, or to engage in any other activity. Without banking permits, licenses, charters, and franchises, the door is not open to the game played by many states in the 19th century.
“To operate a bank in our state, you must use some of your depositors’ funds to buy the bonds sold by our state. In return, we will protect you from competition by not allowing out-of-state banks to operate here.”
Most banks felt that was a good trade-off, at least until they collapsed due to risk concentration and defaults on state government bonds.
State and federal government bonds are an important issue. We will leave the question of whether and when government borrowing is appropriate to a discussion of fiscal policy. There is an important monetary policy that must be addressed. Government bonds must not be treated as money. They must not become the base of the monetary system (as they are today). If a bank wants to buy a bond, including a government bond, that is a decision that should be made by the bank’s management.
An important and related principle is that bonds (private or government) must not be “paid off” by the issuance of new bonds! Legitimate credit is obtained to finance a productive project. The financing should match the reasonable estimate of the useful life of the project, and the full cost must be amortized over this life. If the project continues to generate returns after it is amortized, there is little downside in such a conservative estimate (though it obviously makes the investor case less attractive).
On the other hand, if the plant bought by the bond is all used up before the bond is paid off, then the entrepreneur made a grave error: he did not adequately deduct depreciation from his cash flows and now he is stuck with a remaining debt but no cash flow with which to pay it off. Issuing another bond to pay off the first just extends the time of reckoning, and makes it worse. Fully paying debt before incurring more debt enforces a kind of integrity that is almost impossible to imagine today.
With few very limited and special exceptions, a bank should never borrow short and lend long. This is when a bank lends a demand deposit, or similarly lends a time deposit for longer than its duration. A bank should scrupulously match its assets to its liabilities. If a bank wants to buy stocks, real estate, or tulips, it should not be forcibly prevented, even though these are bad assets with which to back deposits. The same applies to duration mismatch Banks must use their best judgment in making investment decisions. However, the job of monetary scientists is to bellow from the rooftops that borrowing short to lend long will inevitably collapse, like all pyramid schemes (see the author’s paper: Duration Mismatch Will Always Fail).
There should be no price-fixing laws. Just as the price of a bushel of wheat or a laptop computer needs to be set in the market, so should the price of silver and the price of credit. If the market chooses to employ silver as money in addition to gold, then the price of silver must be free to move with the needs of the markets. It was the attempt to fix the price, starting in 1792 that caused many of the early problems. While “de jure” the US was on a bimetallic standard, we noted in Part I that “de facto” it was on a silver standard. Undervalued gold was either hoarded or exported. After 1834, silver was undervalued and the situation reversed. Worse yet, each time the price-fixing regime was altered, there was an enormous transfer of wealth from one class of people to another.
Similarly, if the market chooses to adopt rough diamonds, copper, or “bitcoins” then there should be no law and no regulation to prevent it (though we do not expect any of these things to be monetized) and no law or regulation to fix their prices either.
If a bank takes deposits and issues paper notes, then those notes are subject to the constant due diligence and validation of everyone in the market to whom they are offered. If a spread opens up between Bank A’s one-ounce silver note and the one-ounce silver coin (i.e. the note trades at a discount to the coin) then the market is trying to say something.
What if an electrical circuit keeps blowing its fuse? It is dangerous to replace the fuse with a copper penny. It masks the problem temporarily, and encourages you to plug in more electrical appliances, until the circuit overheats and set the house on fire. It is similar with a government-set price of paper credit.
A market price for notes and bills is the right idea. Free participants in the markets can choose between keeping their gold coin at home (hoarding) vs. lending their gold coin to a bank (saving). It is important to realize that credit begins with the saver, and it must be voluntary, like everything else in a free market. People have a need to extend credit as explained below, but they will not do so if they do not trust the creditworthiness of the bank.
Before banking, the only way to plan for retirement was to directly convert 5% or 10% of one’s weekly income into wealth by hoarding salt or silver. Banking makes it much more efficient, because one can indirectly exchange income for wealth while one is working. Later, one can exchange the wealth for income. This way, the wealth works for the saver his whole life, and there is no danger of “outliving one’s wealth”, if one spends only the interest. In contrast, if one is spending one’s capital by dishoarding, one could run out.
No discussion on banking would be complete without addressing the issue of fractional reserves. Many fundamental misunderstandings exist in this area, including the belief that banks “create money”. Savers extend credit to the banks who then extend credit to businesses. The banks can no more be said to be creating money than an electrical wire can be said to be creating energy.
Another error is the idea that two or more people own the same gold coin at the same time. When one puts gold on deposit, one gives up ownership of the gold. The depositor does not own the gold any longer. He owns a credit instrument, a piece of paper with a promise to pay in the future. So long as the bank does not mismatch the duration of this deposit with the duration of the asset it buys, there is no conflict.
If people want to vault their gold only, perhaps with some payment transfer mechanism, there would be such a warehousing service offered in the market. But this is not banking. It’s just vaulting, and most people prefer the convenience of fungibility. Who wants the problems of a particular vault location and a delay to transfer it elsewhere? And who wants a negative yield on money just sitting there?
A related error is the claim, often repeated on the Internet, is that a bank takes 1,000 ounces in deposit and then lends 10,000 out. Poof! Money has been created—and to add insult to injury, the banks charge interest! The error here is that of confusing the result of a market process (of many actors) with a single bank action. If Joe deposits 1,000 ounces of gold, the bank will lend not 10,000 ounces but 900 ounces (assuming a 10% reserve ratio).
Mary the borrower may spend the money to build a new factory. Jim the contractor who builds it may deposit the 900 ounces in a bank. The bank may then lend 810 ounces, and so on. This process works if and only if each borrower spends 100% of the money and if the vendors who earned their money deposit 100% of it, in a time deposit. Otherwise, the credit (this is credit, not money) simply does not multiply as Rothbard asserts.
This view of money multiplication does not consider time as a variable. Gold payable on demand is not the same as gold payable in 30 years. It will not trade the same in the markets. The 30-year time deposit or bond will pay interest, have a wide bid-ask spread, and therefore not be accepted in trade for goods or services.
This process involving the decisions of innumerable actors in the free market may have a result that is 10X credit expansion. But one cannot make a shortcut, presume that it will happen, and then assert that the banks are “swindling.”
If one confuses credit (paper) with money (gold), and one believes that inflation is an “increase in the money supply” (see here for this author’s definition: Inflation: An Expansion of Counterfeit Credit) then one is opposed to any credit expansion and hence any banking. Without realizing it, one finds oneself advocating for the stagnation of the medieval village, with a blacksmith, cobbler, cooper, and group of subsistence farmers. Anything larger than a family workshop requires credit.
Credit and credit expansion is a process that has a natural brake in the gold standard when people are free to deposit or withdraw their gold coin. Each depositor must be satisfied with the return he is getting in exchange for the risk and lack of liquidity for the duration. If the depositor is unhappy with the bank’s (or bond market’s) offer, he can withdraw his gold.
This trade-off between hoarding the gold coin and depositing it in the bank sets the floor under the rate of interest. Every depositor has his threshold. If the rate falls (or credit risk rises) sufficiently, and enough depositors at the margin withdraw their gold, then the banking system is deprived of deposits, which drives down the price of the bond which forces the rate of interest up. This is one half of the mechanism that acts to keep the rate of interest stable.
The ceiling above the interest rate is set by the marginal business. No business can borrow at a rate higher than its rate of profit. If the rate ticks above this, the marginal business is the first to buy back its outstanding bonds and sell capital stock (or at least not sell a bond to expand). Ultimately, the marginal businessman may liquidate and put his money into the bonds of a more productive enterprise.
A stable interest rate is vitally important. If the rate of interest rises, it is like a wrecking ball swinging into defenseless buildings. As noted above, each uptick forces marginal businesses to close their operations. If the rise is protracted, it could really cause the affected country’s industry to be hollowed out. On the other hand, if the rate falls, the wrecking ball swings to the other side of the street. The ruins on the first side are not rebuilt. But now, capital is destroyed through a different and very pernicious process: the burden of each dollar of (existing) debt rises at the same time that the lower rate encourages more borrowing (see: Falling Interest Rates Destroy Capital). From 1947 to 1981, the US was afflicted with the rising interest rate disorder. From 1981 until present, the second stage of the disease has plagued us.
Today, under the paper standard, the rate of interest is volatile. The need to hedge interest rate risks (and foreign exchange rate risk, something else that does not exist under the gold standard) is the main reason for the massive derivatives market. In this market for derivatives, which is estimated to be approaching 1 quadrillion dollars (one thousand trillion or one million billion), market participants including businesses and governments seek to buy financial instruments to protect them against adverse changes. Those who sell such instruments need to hedge as well. Derivatives are an endless circle of futures, options on futures, options on options, “swaptions”, etc.
The risk cannot be hedged, but it does lead to a small group of large and highly co-dependant banks, who each sell one another exotic derivative products. Each deems itself perfectly hedged, and yet the system becomes ever more fragile and susceptible to “black swans”.
These big banks are deemed “too big to fail.” And the label is accurate. The monetary system would not survive the collapse of JP Morgan, for example. A default by JPM on tens or perhaps a few hundred trillion of dollars of liabilities would cause many other banks, insurers, pensions, annuities, and employers to become insolvent. Consequently, second-worst problem is that the government and the central bank will always provide bailouts when necessary. This, of course, is called “moral hazard” because it encourages JPM management to take ever more risk in pursuit of profits. Gains belong to JPM, but losses go to the public.
There is something even worse. Central planners must increasingly plan around the portfolios of these banks. Any policy that would cause them big losses is non-viable because it would risk a cascade of failures through the financial system, as one “domino” topples another. This is one reason why the rate of interest keeps falling. The banks (and the central bank) are “all in” buying long-duration bonds, and if the interest rate started moving up they would all be insolvent. Also, they are borrowing short to lend long so the central bank accommodates their endless need to “roll” their liabilities when due and give them the benefit of a lower interest payment.
The problems of the irredeemable dollar system are intractable. Halfway measures, such as proposed by Robert Zoelick of the World Bank that the central banks “watch” the gold price will not do. Ill-considered notions such as turning the IMF into the issuer of a new irredeemable currency won’t work. Well-meaning gestures such as a gold “backed” currency (price fixing?) might have worked in another era, but with the secular decline in trust, why shouldn’t people just redeem their paper for gold? One cannot reverse cause and effect, trust and credit. And that’s what a paper note is based on: trust.
The world needs the unadulterated gold standard, as outlined in this paper, Part III of a series.